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of Lehman Brothers and the rescue of AIG: they can be labeled macro-economic, micro-economic,
and geo-political.  First, the paper considers the story of monetary policy failures; second, there follows
an examination of the micro-economic issues concerned with bank regulation and the reorganization
of banking following the failure of one or more major financial institutions and the threat of systemic
collapse; third, the paper turns to the issue of global imbalances and asks whether there are parallels

















The Great Depression Analogy 
 
Michael Bordo and Harold James   
 
In the discussion of our contemporary economic disease, the 
Great Depression analogy refuses to go away.  Almost every 
policy-maker referred to conditions that had “not been seen 
since the Great Depression,” even before the failure of Lehman.  
Some even went further – the Deputy Governor of the Bank of 
England notably called the crisis the worst “financial crisis in 
human history”.  In its April 2009 World Economic Outlook, the 
IMF looked explicitly at the analogy not only in the collapse of 
financial confidence, but also in the rapid decline of trade and 
industrial activity across the world.  In general, history 
rather than economic theory seems to offer a guide in 
interpreting wildly surprising and inherently unpredictable 
events.  Some observers, notably Paul Krugman, concluded that a 
Dark Age of macroeconomics has set in (Krugman 2009).  There are 
however substantial uncertainties about what precisely the 
lessons of history might be. Charles Plosser, president of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, recently said tellingly 
that:  “We are still rewriting the narrative, and gaining an 
understanding, of what happened in the Great Depression  and 
why. No doubt it will be at least 50 years before we understand 
very well what happened in 2008 and 2009 and whether the Federal 
Reserve undertook the right policies or the wrong policies.” 
(New York Times, 2010)  
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This paper examines three areas in which analogies have 
been made between the interwar depression and the financial 
crisis of 2007 which reached a dramatic climax in September 2008 
with the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the rescue of AIG: they 
can be labeled macro-economic, micro-economic, and global.  
First, the paper considers the story of monetary policy 
failures; second, there follows an examination of the micro-
economic issues concerned with bank regulation and the 
reorganization of banking following the failure of one or more 
major financial institutions and the threat of systemic 
collapse; third, the paper turns to the issue of global 
imbalances and asks whether there are parallels that might be 





Almost every contemporary use of the depression analogy 
takes the year 1929 as a reference point.  But there are really 
two completely different pathologies during the Great 
Depression, which involve different diagnoses and different 
cures. 
The first, and the most famous, pathology is the U.S. stock 
market crash of October 1929. No other country had a stock 
market panic of the magnitude of the American one, in large part 
because no other country had experienced the euphoric run-up of 
stock prices that sucked large numbers of Americans, from very 
different backgrounds, into financial speculation.  The second  
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sickness, contagious banking panics, was decisive in turning a 
bad recession into the Great Depression.  A series of bank 
panics beginning in October 1930 in the United States converted 
a not unusual recession from 1929-1930 into a serious slump. 
Through the fixed exchange rate gold standard the U.S. 
depression also affected the rest of the world. Events took a 
turn for the worst after the collapse and rescue of the 
Creditanstalt bank in Vienna in May 1931 and a major banking 
crisis in Germany in June. This spread financial contagion to 
Great Britain, to France  and back to the US .   
The 1929 panic has dominated a great deal of the analysis 
of the depression for two rather peculiar reasons.  First, no 
one has ever satisfactorily been able to explain the collapse of 
the market in October 1929 in terms of a rational explanation, 
in which market participants reacted to a specific news event.  
So the crash presents an intriguing intellectual puzzle, and 
economists can build reputations on trying to find innovative 
accounts.  Some people just conclude that markets are simply 
irrational.  Indeed, there is considerable evidence that the 
most disturbing shocks to market expectations do not arise from 
identifiable “news” (Bouchaud 2010).  Others (notably White) 
have argued that investors might have been able to foresee the 
Depression, or that they were pondering the likelihood of 
protectionist reactions in other countries to the American 
(Smoot Hawley) tariff act which had not yet even been cast in 
its final form. 
The second reason that 1929 has been popular with academic 
and political commentators is that the aftermath of the collapse 
provides a clear motive for taking particular policy measures. 
Stock exchange collapses or the end of asset bubbles do not  
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necessarily lead to prolonged recessions of deep depression.  In 
October 1987 and again in March 2000 sharp stock market 
collapses triggered both an extension of liquidity by the 
central bank and fiscal easing.  Keynesians thought that 
government fiscal demand can stabilize the expectations of the 
market, and thus provide an overall framework of stability.  
Monetarists saw monetary stability as the key to avoiding 
dramatic output contractions.  Much of this debate has focused 
on the United States: in other countries, especially debtor 
countries, the gold standard constrained monetary policy so that 
it is hard to speak of policy options.  The only country where 
there was an equivalent room for maneuver to the United States 
is France. 
The Great Contraction of 1929-1933 in the United States 
during which prices, real output and money supply declined by 
about a third,and which spread to the rest of the world, was 
precipitated by policy failures at the Federal Reserve. A tight 
monetary policy to kill stock market speculation in 1928 led to 
a recession beginning in August 1929. This policy was based on 
the real bills view that stock market speculation would lead to 
inflation, a bust and then deflation. The stock market crash in 
October exacerbated the downturn but did not cause the 
depression. The failure of the Fed to follow its mandate from 
the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 to act as lender of last resort 
and to allay a series of four banking panics beginning in 
October 1930 led to the serious downturn that followed. The Fed 
adhered to the flawed Burgess Riefler doctrine ( Meltzer 2003) 
which viewed low levels of its borrowed reserves( i.e discount 
window borrowing) and short-term interest rate indicators as 
signs of monetary ease and hence did not act. In addition some  
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Fed officials believed in the liquidationist doctrine and saw 
bank failures as beneficial. A major hike in the discount rate 
in the fall of 1931 to protect the dollar after sterling exited 
from the gold standard added fuel to the fire. 
Recovery began in March 1933 with Roosevelt’s banking 
holiday, ending the fourth banking panic. The nation’s banks 
were closed for a week during which an army of bank examiners 
separated the insolvent from the rest. Insolvent banks were 
closed ending the uncertainty driving the panic. This action was 
quickly followed by FDR taking the U.S. off the gold standard in 
April, Treasury gold ( and silver) purchases designed to raise 
gold prices and prices in general, and formal devaluation of the 
dollar by close to 60% in January 1934. These policies produced 
a big reflationary impulse from gold inflows which were 
unsterilized passing directly into the money supply. They also 
helped convert deflationary expectations into inflationary ones 
( Eggertsson 2008).Also of key importance in preventing future 
banking panics was the institution of federal deposit 
insurance(FDIC) in the Banking Act of 1933  which went into 
effect January 1 1934. 
 The recovery of 1933 to 1941 in the United States was 
largely driven by gold inflows (initially reflecting Treasury 
policy and the devaluation, later reflecting capital flight from 
Europe as war loomed). Expansionary fiscal policy, despite the 
conventional wisdom, played only a minor role in the recovery of 
the 1930s (Romer 1992). Recovery was impeded somewhat by New 
Deal cartelization policies like the NIRA which in an attempt to 
raise wages and prices artificially reduced labor supply and 
aggregate supply (Cole and Ohanian 2004).  Over the period 1933-
1937 output increased by 33%.   
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The Federal Reserve was largely passive in the 1930s.  
Along with the bankers, it had been blamed by the Roosevelt 
administration for the failures of the 1920s and early 1930s. 
Major reforms in the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 greatly 
increased the powers of the Federal Reserve Board in Washington 
at the expense of the Reserve banks and especially the New York 
Fed. Despite its increase in power, the reconstituted Board of 
Governors under Chairman Mariner Eccles was passive and largely 
subservient to the dictates of Treasury Secretary Morgenthau. 
The Fed in the 1930s continued to follow the same precepts as it 
did in the 1920s and early 1930s. Its policy indicator continued 
to be the level of free reserves( excess reserves less 
borrowings from the Fed). In the 1930s borrowed reserves were 
negligible so excess reserves became the indicator. As the 
decade wore on member banks largely absorbed the gold inflows 
into excess reserves, held as a precaution against a repeat of 
the type of turbulence experienced in the early thirties. By 
1935 excess reserves amounted to 50% of total reserves.  Fed 
officials increasingly viewed the build up of excess reserves as 
a threat to future speculation and inflation.  They also saw the 
presence of sizable excess reserves as preventing them from 
future tightening. Similar concerns have been voiced about the 
build up in bank excess reserves in 2008-2009. According to the 
Burgess Riefler doctrine which prevailed at the Fed, the way the 
Fed could control interest rates was by forcing banks to borrow 
from the Fed. Once borrowed reserves were less than the open 
market portfolio, then open market sales could force the banks 
to borrow. Banks would then want to reduce their indebtedness by 
contracting their lending  ( Meltzer 2003 pp 520-521).  
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The Recession of 1937-1938: The recovery was interrupted by 
a serious recession (the third worst of the twentieth century) 
from May 1937 to June 1938. Friedman and Schwartz ( 1963) and 
Meltzer (2003) and others attribute the recession to a serious 
policy mistake by the Federal Reserve. Mounting concern by the 
Fed over the build up in excess reserves in member banks led the 
Board to double reserve requirements in three steps between 
August 1936 and May 1937. The rationale for this action was to 
restore the Fed’s control over monetary policy and remove the 
inflationary threat posed by the excess reserves. The Fed used 
the blunt instrument of raising reserve requirements rather than 
conducting an open market sale of securities because  excess 
reserves exceeded the Fed’s portfolio of securities and sales 
would reduce the income earned from it. According to Friedman 
and Schwartz the banks were holding excess reserves as a 
precaution against a repeat of the banking panics of the 1930s. 
When the Fed locked up these reserves the banks cut back on 
lending and sold earning assets to restore the precautionary 
cushion they had held. The Fed’s contractionary policy action 
was complemented by the Treasury’s decision in late 1936 to 
sterilize gold inflows in order to reduce excess reserves. These 
policy actions led to a spike in short-term interest rates and a 
severe decline in money supply precipitating a 5 % decline in 
real GDP. 
Other explanations given for the recession of 1937-38 
include: a tightening of fiscal policy when the Administration 
ended a generous veteran’s bonus, increased income tax rates and 
imposed a tax on undistributed profits; gold hoarding brought 
about by fears of another dollar devaluation coupled with a 
boost to money wages by the Wagner Act (Sumner 2009) and a  
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switch back from inflationary to deflationary expectations 
(Eggertsson and Pugsley 2006). 
The recession ended after FDR in April 1938 pressured the 
Fed to roll back reserve requirements, the Treasury stopped 
sterilizing gold inflows and desterilized all the remaining gold 
sterilized since December 1936, and the Administration began 
pursuing expansionary fiscal policy. The recovery from 1938 to 
1942 was spectacular, output grew by 49% fueled by gold inflows 
from Europe and a major defense build up. 
The Liquidity Trap:  The 1930s were characterized by very 
low interest rates. Short-term rates were close to zero through 
much of the decade. Long-term rates were close to 2%. The 
traditional Keynesian view has been that monetary policy was 
impotent because the U.S. economy was in a liquidity trap. Like 
the 1930s a Federal Funds rate in 2008 close to zero( the zero 
lower bound) has again raised the issue of policy impotence. 
 Subsequent research by Brunner and Meltzer (1968) found no 
evidence for the liquidity trap. There was a spectrum of rates 
well above zero throughout the 1930s and the Fed could just as 
easily have bought securities other than short-term Treasury 
bills (Basile and Rockoff  2009). The real problem was not that 
Fed policy didn’t work but rather that the Fed was unwilling to 
use the tools that it had to conduct expansionary monetary 
policy because it feared a resurgence of asset market 
speculation and inflation (Orphanides 2004). 
 
Lessons for Today: The history of the 1930s experience has 
several lessons for the present discussion over the policies  
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that the Fed could follow to ensure a rapid recovery without 
engendering inflation. 
The first lesson is that the Fed like its predecessor 
seventy years ago has the tools to reflate the economy and to 
prevent a resurgence of inflation. In the 1930’s the Fed was 
only a minor player in the recovery because it was reluctant to 
use expansionary open market purchases for fear of rekindling 
speculation and inflation. It was not in reality stuck in a 
liquidity trap or hampered by the zero lower bound. Instead the 
Treasury through its policies towards gold and the consequence 
of devaluing the dollar did more of the heavy lifting to promote 
recovery. 
In the recent crisis the Fed’s policy of sterilizing the 
effects on the monetary base of its diverse liquidity operations 
through much of 2008 (until September) made monetary policy 
tighter than it had to be and likely exacerbated the recession 
which began in December 2007( Hetzel 2009) .However since 
October 2008 the base greatly expanded and the policy adopted in 
January 2009 of quantitative easing ( and continued in November 
2010) by purchasing long-term Treasuries and mortgage backed 
securities can be viewed as a replay of the expansionary 
Treasury gold policy of the 1930s. 
Second, the Fed will eventually have to tighten as the 
economy recovers and excess capacity is reduced. Some have 
raised the fear that this could produce a repeat of the 
recession of 1937-1938 were the Fed to attempt to reduce the 
excess reserves and the banks (still gun-shy from the recent 
crisis) to scramble to replace them. This should not be a 
problem for a number of reasons. First the excess reserves were  
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built up in the two eras under very different Fed operating 
procedures. In the 1930s the Fed could not target the interest 
rate as it had done in the 1920s because the banks were 
reluctant to borrow reflecting a stigma from doing so.  Moreover 
the build up of excess reserves was a consequence of the gold 
inflows and, given the Fed’s preferred operating procedures, 
created a problem for it. 
 Today the Fed follows an interest rate target and it can 
pay interest on reserves (IOR). The build up of reserves 
reflected sterilization of the Fed’s liquidity operations using 
interest on reserves,(when the federal funds rate was close to 
zero), as the mechanism to get banks to hold them. Were the Fed 
to wish to tighten it can separate its monetary policy 
operations from its liquidity policy by changing the spread 
between the funds rate and the IOR. (Goodfriend 2009). Unlike 
the Fed of the 1930s, today’s Fed can use reverse repos or open 
market sales of its long-term securities to do the tightening. 
Were it to wish to reduce excess reserves to encourage banks to 
lend it could pay negative interest on reserves as was done 
recently by the Riksbank in Sweden.  
 The main concern for today is not that the Fed can not 
exit from its present strategy because it can, but that when it 
exits and begins tightening that if unemployment were still to 
be high and were to begin to rise again in the face of the 
tightening, that the Fed would come under political pressure to 
abandon its efforts and cave in under the pressure. In that case 
inflationary pressures would build up as the bond markets and 
the public began to doubt the Fed’s resolve. This is what 
happened in 1966 and 1969 under William McChesney Martin and in 




The Financial Sector 
 
Banking collapses played a crucial role in the deepening of 
the global crisis in 1931.  Unlike the United States, where 
banking was highly localized, continental European economies 
were dominated by financial systems in which a small number of 
very large banks dominated the economy.  In Austria, where the 
crisis began in May 1931, the Creditanstalt controlled some 60 
percent of Austrian firms through ownership stakes (Nötel 1984).  
The failure or potential failure of very large financial 
institutions thus posed a major policy problem. 
The collapses were the result of the shocks of the 
international depression imposed upon bank weakness in countries 
that had been wrecked by the aftermath of bad policies that 
produced inflation, hyper-inflation, and a destruction of banks’ 
balance sheets.  An intrinsic vulnerability made for a 
heightened exposure to political shocks, and disputes about a 
central European customs union and about the postwar reparations 
issue was enough to topple a house of cards. 
  Banks in 1931 were vulnerable as a result of poor monetary 
policy, and they were victims of monetary deflation (Temin 
2007).  But there were plenty of specific issues which long-
antedated the collapses of the early 1930s (James 1986). They 
are the result of specific design features of the financial 
system that could not simply be corrected by macro-economic 
policy, whether monetary or fiscal.  U.S. banking was highly 
localized, and thus vulnerable to geographically limited shocks  
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(such as the agricultural depression); while larger nationwide 
banking in Canada was much more resilient.  Banks in many debtor 
countries in South America and Central Europe accumulated 
mismatches between assets (in local currency) and liabilities 
(in dollars or other key currencies), that made for a 
vulnerability to currency turmoil.  Universal banks suffered 
large losses on their shareholdings, and as their capitalization 
fell, cut back on their lending.  Some British banks (the so-
called merchant banks) had heavy overseas exposures that made 
them vulnerable to foreign crises (James 2001, Accominotti 
2009). 
  One of the striking features of the Depression analogy is 
how many of the answers regarding the banking sector are popular 
again today: in particular, the provision of state guarantees to 
attempt to revive the interbank market and bank lending; 
recapitalization of banks with public money; and the 
establishment of “bad banks” to take problematic assets off 
banks’ balance sheets.  All of these policy responses were tried 
in the 1930s, most notably in the epicenter of the central 
European collapse, in Germany. 
   Some of the initiatives that the German government took had 
a quite modern ring to them. Indeed this was an area in which 
the German government appeared to act swiftly in order to 
implement a crisis management strategy.  First, the government 
reorganized the banks, merging the two weakest ones, Danat and 
Dresdener Bank, that had been at the origin of the banking 
collapse, and injecting government money into all of them.  
Initially, the government had tried hard to get private money as 
well, and there were intense negotiations with the leading 
figures of the powerful Rhine-Ruhr steel lobby.  In the end the  
 
14
business leaders only agreed if the government would put in more 
money, and if the government advanced them the sums that they 
were supposed to invest in the recapitalization of Danat Bank.  
By 1932, 91 percent of the Dresdner Bank’s capital, 70 percent 
of Commerzbank’s and 35 percent of Deutsche Bank’s was in public 
ownership. 
Second, the German central bank (the Reichsbank) pushed for 
a new institution which would allow it to discount bills from 
banks which could not be traded because the interbank market had 
stopped operating.  This institution, named the Akzept- und 
Garantiebank, was established with breath-taking speed.  It was 
given a public guarantee in order to provide the additional 
signature that made bills eligible for Reichsbank lending 
(rediscounting). 
Third, the Reichsbank eventually (in December 1932) created 
what would now be called a “bad bank” to take over troubled 
assets whose prices no longer corresponded to the value at which 
they were set in the banks’ balance sheet. Two new institutions 
would take assets off firms’ and banks’ balance sheets:   the 
first, the Deutsche Finanzierungsinstitut AG took over up to 
three quarters of the bad assets of a bank, but required an 
annual amortization at 3 percent.  The second, the Tilgungskasse 
für gewerbliche Kredite, required a much lower rate of 
servicing, only 1 percent, for an initial three year period, 
followed by higher rates as economic recovery set in. 
Lessons for today 
The consequence of the long academic and popular discussion 
of the 1929 crisis and the appropriate policy response is that 
people have come to the expectation that there must be easy  
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answers.  But the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 
was a 1931-like event, the failure of a large financial 
institution.  The answers required are less obvious than in the 
domain of monetary or fiscal policy, where lessons of the Great 
Depression are much clearer. 
Finding a way out of the damage created by the collapse of 
a systemically important financial institution was and is very 
tough.  Unlike in the case of a 1929-type event, there are no 
obvious macro-economic answers to financial distress, 
particularly when it involves institutions that are deemed to be 
“too big to fail”.  Some famous macro-economists, including 
Larry Summers, the chief economic thinker of the Obama 
administration until late 2010, in consequence tried to play 
down the role of financial sector instability in causing 
depressions.  Robert Lucas’s claim in 2003 that the “central 
problem of depression-prevention has been solved” is one of the 
central pieces of evidence for Krugman’s onslaught on 
conventional macro-economics.   
1.  A key problem at the heart of both the 1931 crisis in 
Central Europe (but not in the United States) and of 2008 in the 
U.S. and Europe was the doctrine of “too big to fail”.  For the 
U.S., this doctrine was born only in the aftermath of the Latin 
American debt crisis of 1982, which threatened the solvency of 
almost all financial institutions in the industrial countries.  
In 1984 the doctrine was applied to justify the decision to bail 
out Continental Illinois, the fourth biggest U.S. bank which was 
insolvent. As banks grew in the 1990s and 2000s, and their 
interconnectedness increased, the doctrine evolved and was 
augmented by an argument about banks being “too interconnected 
to fail”. In 2008 the doctrine contributed to the worsening of  
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financial crisis, as the belief that large commercial banks 
would not be allowed to fail was extended to investment banks 
with the rescue of Bear Stearns in March 2008. Then in September 
when Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail and AIG was rescued the 
resulting confusion led to panic. Too big to fail has also 
hampered the recovery by preventing the use of the good bank/bad 
bank solution (that had been used so successfully in the past by 
Sweden and other countries) towards Citigroup, Bank of America 
in the US and some big banks in Europe: RBOS, Lloyds-HBOS, UBS. 
In consequence, governments took on too large shares in 
financial institutions in order to recapitalize them, a move 
analogous to what happened in 1931 in Germany.  And as in 
Germany in 1931 several governments have already been repaid by 
some of the banks which were rescued at a profit. A major 
collapse of a large part of the financial system requires a slow 
and painful cleaning up of balance sheets; and in micro-economic 
restructuring, which cannot be solely imposed from above by an 
all-wise planner but also requires many businesses and 
individuals to change their outlook and behavior.  The 
improvement of regulation and supervision, while a good idea, is 
better suited to avoiding future crises than dealing with the 
consequences of a catastrophe that has already occurred. 
3. The involvement of government in financial rescues 
transfers private debt into the public sector, and creates 
difficulties for public finance unless there is a dramatic and 
quick recovery of the prices of financial assets. The Austrian 
government’s answer to the 1931 Creditanstalt crisis involved 
taking over the bank, and eventually merging it with other 
weakened Austrian banks, the Wiener Bankverein and the 
Niederösterreichische Escompte Gesellschaft.  The government  
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subsidy was expensive, amounting to 9 to 10 percent of GNP, 
substantially less than the cost of bailouts for Mexico or Japan 
in the 1990s, but much less than the cost of the Irish 
government’s ill-conceived guarantee of Irish bank deposits in 
2008, which was responsible for sending the government deficit 
to over 30 percent of GDP in 2010.  In the 1930s, the aftermath 
of the bailout paralyzed Austrian policy throughout the 1930s 
and made the country vulnerable to internal extremism and 
external attack.  It is likely that Irish politics will be 
profoundly transformed in the wake of 2011 elections. 
 4. Bailouts create political economy problems.  Bailouts 
are inherently controversial, because they distribute public 
money in an arbitrary way, to one recipient rather than another. 
In the United States, Herbert Hoover’s innovative Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation of 1932 quickly ran into problems because of 
this issue: it turned out that the credits were going to banks, 
farms and businesses that were well connected with Republican 
politics.  Germany offers an even more dramatic example of this 
kind of problem.  As part of the bank bailout in the aftermath 
of the 1931 crisis, 2.5 m. Reichsmarks was put into a small 
Berlin institution, Hardy & Co., that was a subsidiary of the 
Dresdner Bank.  This money was primarily intended to flow into 
the electoral campaign coffers of Paul von Hindenburg, the 
veteran First World War commander who had been elected President 
of Germany and was standing for reelection in 1932 (Bähr and 
Ziegler). 
  In the fragile situation of Weimar Germany, the bailout 
that was at the center of the government’s response to the 
banking crisis ran into every kind of objection. The claim that 
the government had been engaged in the “socialization of losses”  
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became an important part of the turbulent electoral campaigns of 
1932. In order to get support from the Akzeptbank, banks had to 
demonstrate that “important economic interests” were at stake, 
and in practice the majority of Akzeptbank credit went to the 
savings banks (Sparkassen).  It was also used to support 
enterprises in strategically vital areas, notably Silesia.  The 
special issues involved in the support of Silesian industry, and 
the fear of an opportunistic takeover by foreign issues, led to 
the Chancellor Heinrich Brüning’s most problematical and indeed 
scandalous rescue operation, the so-called Gelsenberg purchase 
concluded on the last day that Brüning and his Finance Minister 
Hermann Dietrich, the driving force of this bailout, were in 
office.  In this transaction, the government, which as a result 
of the banking crisis had become Flick’s largest creditor, 
bought out Flick’s interest in the steel giant Vereinigte 
Stahlwerke. Dietrich’s former State Secretary Hans Schäffer 
referred to the operation as “extreme stupidity”. 
  The rescue of the Creditanstalt was also accompanied by 
massive corruption, the revelation of which became the stock-in-
trade of the opposition Nazi movement in Austria. Then, as now, 
there was massive public hostility to the idea of a bailout, in 
that it appeared to be a form of support for the institutions 
and people who really bore the responsibility for the crisis. 
  The cost of bailouts, even when they seemed to have been 
administered promptly and with high efficiency as in the German 
case, thus exceeded the simple fiscal arithmetic.  They brought 
the state into a series of contentious micro-level decisions on 
the health of particular enterprises and on the fate of 
individual bank directors.  Given the poisonous ideological 
backdrop of anti-Semitism in the context of Central Europe in  
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the 1930s, it is unsurprising that this radical doctrine was 
fanned by the character of the government’s response to banking 
crises, and that both in Germany and more explicitly in Austria 
a process of expropriating Jewish property (“aryanization”) that 
was at first called Germanization or Austrianization set in even 
before the Nazis took power in those countries. The episodes of 
managing bank failures in retrospect look like the beginning of 
a process of state-domination, corruption, and even racial 
persecution that would roll on like an ever more menacing 
snowball. 
  The politics of bank and industrial bailouts after 2008 
raised fears of a new financial and economic nationalism, as 
governments become more directly involved in the micro-
management of the economy.  Banks in state ownership of with a 
substantial degree of public investment – Citigroup, Lloyds-
HBOS, RBS, Commerzbank –cut back on foreign activities and sold 
foreign assets, at least in part because of government pressure 
that taxpayer money should not be used for the benefit of 
foreign borrowers.  Economic nationalism was even more evident 
in the debate about government rescues of the automobile 
industry in 2009, where domestic jobs are protected at the cost 




  Global imbalances played a major role in the origins of the 
Great Depression and many argue that they are also a significant 
cause of the Great Recession.  In the Great Depression, the  
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imbalances were unwound and reversed: capital after 1931-33 
flowed back to the creditor countries, above all to the U.S.  
The unwinding of imbalances involved an asymmetric adjustment.  
Creditor countries did little, while the deficit countries 
reduced their level of economic activity in order to make 
transfers. 
  Of course not all imbalances are bad or unsustainable.  In 
the nineteenth century, some countries ran persistent deficits 
because they were growing more quickly (Australia or the U.S.) 
and others had substantial surpluses because of high savings 
accumulation in a mature economy (UK and France).  Some 
countries (such as the Ottoman empire or Russia, or Greece) had 
public debt induced deficits that were unsustainable, and which 
led to isolated debt crises but no general reversal of capital 
flows.  In the 1920s, the imbalances that built up in central 
Europe were heavily driven by unsustainable expansions of public 
spending and private consumption; and the simultaneous collapse 
led to a general reversal of capital flows.   
  There was in the Great Depression a great deal of 
discussion about the need for more and better international 
cooperation.  In 1930, the Bank for International Settlements 
began work in Basel.  Its creators, above all the influential 
Governor of the Bank of England, Montagu Norman, envisaged its 
role as not only arranging for the safe and painless transfer of 
German reparations (its primary role) but also in devising 
crisis support mechanisms for troubled debtors.   
The highpoint of international cooperation was supposed to 
be the 1933 London World Economic Conference.  But its failure 
was almost predestined. The plenary meeting was paralyzed by the  
 
21
way in which the preparatory commissions had worked. Monetary 
experts argued that an agreement on currency stabilization would 
be highly desirable, but that it required a prior agreement on 
the dismantling of trade barriers – all the high tariffs and 
quotas that had been introduced in the course of the depression.  
Trade experts met in parallel and made the mirror image of 
this argument. They agreed that protectionism was obviously a 
vice, but thought that it was a necessary one that could not be 
addressed without monetary stability.  Only leadership by a 
determined great power, prepared to sacrifice its particular 
national interests in order to break the resulting impasse, 
might conceivably have saved the meeting. But such leadership 
was as unlikely then as it is now.  
A further lesson of the London Conference of 1933 consists 
in governments’ unwillingness in times of great economic 
difficulty to make sacrifices that might entail a short-term 
cost. Even if the result would have been longer-term stability, 
the immediate political consequences were too unpleasant. In 
adverse economic circumstances, governments felt vulnerable and 
unsure, and they could not afford to alienate public support.  
Finally, faced by a realization of inevitable failure, 
participants look for a scapegoat. The 1933 Conference looked 
like a classic detective novel in which every party had a reason 
to be a suspect. Britain and France had turned away from 
internationalism, adopting trade systems known as “Imperial 
Preference,” which favored their vast overseas empires. 
Germany’s president had just appointed Adolf Hitler’s radical 
and aggressive government. The German delegation was led by 
Alfred Hugenberg, who was not a Nazi but wanted to show that he  
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was an even more implacable nationalist than Hitler himself. The 
Japanese government had just sent troops into Manchuria.  Of all 
the major powers in London, the United States looked the most 
reasonable and internationalist by far. It had a new, 
charismatic president, who was known as an Anglophile and a 
cosmopolitan spirit. Franklin Roosevelt was already taking 
vigorous action against the depression, and was trying to 
reorder the failed US banking system.  Roosevelt did not know 
what line to take at the conference, and his stream of advisers 
offered inconsistent counsel. At last, he lost patience and 
announced that for the moment the US had no intention of 
stabilizing the dollar. This message, delivered on July 3, 1933, 
was known as “the bombshell.” Roosevelt talked about the need to 
restore “the sound internal economic system of a nation” and 
condemned the “old fetishes of so-called international bankers.”  
Everyone pretended to be shocked at the failure of 
internationalism. But, at the same time, they were delighted to 
have found someone who could be blamed for the failure of the 
conference.  
Lessons from the Failure of International Cooperation: 
  The most obvious lesson from the history of the Great 
Depression concerned the desirability of an institutional 
mechanism to prevent a collapse of trade as a result of 
protective and retaliatory measures – tariffs and quotas.  The 
international trade regime has been institutionalized, first 
through the GATT and then through the WTO.  Although a large 
number of countries introduced some protective measures in the 
wake of the financial crisis, only about 1 percent of world 
imports were affected by the new trade measures instituted  
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between October 2008 and October 2009, in other words in the 
most severe phase of the crisis (OECD 2010).  G-20 meetings in 
November 2008 and April and September 2009 produced agreements 
on anti-protectionist measures, and some countries (notably 
Australia, Mexico and Canada) instituted a systematic reduction 
of tariffs (though Mexico, like Russia, took measures to 
restrict the import of foreign automobiles).   
There was a rapid collapse of trade in the six months after 
the collapse of Lehman in September 2008, whose major cause was 
the unavailability of trade finance rather than trade protection 
measures.  OECD exports fell by 12.9 percent in the last quarter 
of 2008 and by 30.0 percent in the first quarter of 2009.  After 
April 2009, trade recovered rapidly.  Nevertheless, world trade 
in 2009 was around 12.5 percent lower than in 2008 although it 
has almost recovered in 2010. (OECD 2010) 
  In the debates before the World Economic Conference, a 
critical issue was how trade and foreign exchange policy 
interacted.  Multilateral institutions in the Great Recession by 
contrast have dealt largely with a different coordination 
exercise: they have been concerned both with the coordination of 
fiscal stimulus and with exchange rate coordination.  In 
addition, central banks extended swaps, less as an act of 
monetary policy coordination but rather largely in order to deal 
with the currency requirements resulting from large currency 
mismatches in the balance sheets of major cross-national banking 
groups. 
Both the fiscal and the exchange rate sides of the 
coordination exercise are potentially problematic.  The emphasis 
on fiscal stimulus in the early phase of the crisis made some  
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countries vulnerable to doubts about fiscal sustainability in 
the second part of the crisis.  In the European Union, Greece 
and Spain at first presented their stimulus packages as 
contributions to European recovery rather than as sources of 
fragility. 
More importantly, the modern discussion of foreign exchange 
policy is much more controversial and difficult to resolve than 
trade issues, and the international institutional setting – the 
International Monetary Fund - which originally managed this 
issue in the Bretton Woods era has largely lost competence in 
this field.  There has been a great deal of discussion of 
strengthening multilateral surveillance in the wake of the 
crisis, but such surveillance has not had a major policy impact.  
Instead, there are repeated accusations that exchange rates are 
being manipulated in order to achieve trade advantages, 
accusations which recall the bitter polemics of the 1930s.  The 
United States believes that China is undervaluing the renminbi 
in order to drive exports; Europeans complain that quantitative 
easing is a trade policy designed to drive down the dollar; 
Americans assert that the Euro troubles are a mechanism for 
lowering the European exchange rate; and even more troublingly, 
in the European context, southern Europeans are beginning to 
interpret the story of the locked exchange rate of the single 
currency as a device to obtain export advantages by Germany (and 
other northern European states). 
The result of these controversies has been an erosion of 
international economic cooperation.  In the half year following 
the 2008 collapse of Lehman, during the most intense phase of 
the current financial crisis, the world’s political leaders 
reassured themselves that this time international cooperation  
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was working splendidly – by contrast with the grim precedent of 
the nationalistic and autarkic 1930s.  The global elite 
constantly rehearsed and replayed a soothing mantra.  Heroic 
figures, led by Gordon Brown, were rescuing the world through 
far-sighted and beneficent public action. But since then, in an 
uncanny echo of the earlier collapse of international efforts at 
understanding, the prospects for sustained cooperation and for 
agreement on who should adjust have faded. Growth is returning 
for both the major surplus and the deficit countries, and it 
might in consequence be argued that the coordination failure 
does not matter.  But the global imbalances are still there, and 
to the extent to which they are driven by the expansion of 
public debt liabilities may be “bad” imbalances capable of 
leading to a 1930s style reversal. 
The 2010 equivalent of Roosevelt’s bombshell has come from 
the Republican “shellacking” of President Obama in the mid-term 
elections.  The outcome is a restoration for the logical and 
beautifully designed system of checks and balances that the 
eighteenth century constitutional fathers drew up.  That system 
can work as intended and produce an accurate reflection of the 
concerns of ordinary Americans.  It is likely to prevent further 
big bailouts, further economic stimulus measures, but also to 
block efforts at government budget balancing.  The final 
confirmation of the new U.S. stance came one day later, with the 
Fed’s announcement of the new $600 bn. quantitative easing 
program (QE2).  The Fed was quite right to claim that the 
program was not unusual, and that it represented merely monetary 
policy as usual.  It may be that it is exactly what the U.S. 
economy needs at the moment – in precisely the same way as in 
1933 the U.S. needed a flexible exchange rate and benefited from  
 
26
escaping from golden fetters.  Some commentators however argue 
that the pace of recovery as a result of the private sector’s 
own energy and continuous monetary stimulus since late 2008 may 
have made QE2 redundant.  The decision however was justified by 
Fed officials by reference to the dual mandate of the Fed, to 
maintain price stability (where for the moment there is no 
threat of either significant inflation or of any deflation) and 
also a level of economic activity that might generate an 
improvement in the labor market.   
It is only when it comes to the international arena that 
the Fed’s actions are inconsistent with price stability in other 
countries  – or “clueless” as German Finance Minister Wolfgang 
Schäuble undiplomatically put it.  A howl of outrage about U.S. 
monetary policy followed from the finance ministries of every 
emerging market economy.  The Brazilian Finance Minister, Guido 
Mantega spoke of a new “currency war” involving competitive 
devaluation (Financial Times, 2010).  The American complaint 
that China was deliberately under-valuing its exchange rate 
looked out of place as  expansionary Fed policy may have fuelled 
currency wars by weakening the dollar and providing cheap funds 
that would surge in a wave of lending to fuel potential emerging 
market bond bubbles.  U.S. monetary policy is having an impact 
on emerging markets.  Low U.S. rates are fueling a new version 
of the carry trade, and setting off inflationary booms in east 
Asia which are difficult to control by conventional means.  The 
new U.S. policy mix is likely to be interpreted  by some as a 
return to the 1930s experience, when the U.S. turned on in 
itself, abandoning attempts to steer a global economy.  
The failure of currency coordination which would go against 
perceived sovereign interest is not surprising from a political  
 
27
economy viewpoint, and the logic for it in a regime of floating 
exchange rates compared to the interwar gold exchange standard 
is not compelling in terms of economic theory.  There were 
similar failures in the early 1970s, after the Smithsonian 
meeting to determine a set of new exchange rates, or in the mid-
1980s, when attempts at coordination in the Plaza and Louvre 
Finance Ministers’ meetings increased rather than decreased 
financial instability.  The only major reason to worry about 
such failures today is that frustration about the currency 
regime can translate potentially into powerful demands in 
parliaments and other representative assemblies for trade 
retaliation as a response to a currency war.  So far, this trade 
counterblast remains a topic for discussion rather than a 
reality. 
  Moreover, the consequence of failure of international 
cooperation has not been nearly as negative as in the 1930s, 
because there has as yet been no sudden reversal of capital 
flows.  So far, in the aftermath of 2008, some smaller debtor 
countries have been obliged to undertake a sharp adjustment 
(Latvia moved from a current account deficit of 13.1 percent in 
2008 to a 8.6 percent surplus in 2009, and Hungary from – 7.1 
percent to + 0.2 percent)).  But there has been no reversal of 
the position of the largest debtors, the United States or the 
United Kingdom.  Even the Eurozone problem cases, Greece, 
Ireland and Spain continues to run a substantial current account 
deficit, with (increasingly nervous) foreign investors still 
buying government debt (at a substantial premium).  
  In the Great Depression, the major international policy 
problem lay in the export of deflation by the surplus countries, 
France and the U.S.  Today’s equivalent to France’s  
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sterilization of gold inflows in the 1920s would be the argument 
that China is exporting deflation through the sterilization of 
foreign exchange purchases.  But the other side of the modern 
story, the continued large deficits of the major deficit 
economies (US, UK etc.) do not parallel the dramatic adjustment 
of the 1930s.  In the Great Recession, instead the export of 
inflation recalls the experience of the late 1960s and the early 
1970s  reflecting the exorbitant privilege (in the events that 
produced the breakdown the par value or Bretton Woods system).  
Again, this 1970s analogy would point to the danger that 
currency uncertainty may lead to new trade policies.   
  
Why Lessons are Painful 
  There are many lessons from the Great Depression that can 
and should be learnt in respect to the management of our current 
crisis; but they are often not as simple or as easy as many 
commentators believe.  The most important and most unproblematic 
lesson is concerned with the avoidance of the monetary policy 
error of not intervening in the face of banking crises.  The 
policies of the major central banks – the Federal Reserve, the 
European Central Bank, the Bank of England – suggest that this 
is a lesson that has been in the main learnt. However the Fed 
after expanding liquidity in the fall of 2007 then followed too 
contractionary a policy in the first three quarters of 2008 
which may have exacerbated the recession that began in December 
2007.  Some major economies, notably the United States and 
China, have also embarked on large fiscal stimulus programs 
although the jury is still out on how effective they  were .  In 
the Chinese case, there is an acute danger of inflationary  
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overheating; in the U.S. case, there is the fear that the fiscal 
stimulus will significantly worsen already fundamentally 
unsustainable debt dynamics. 
  Learning from the Great Depression in other areas is much 
harder.  A major financial collapse has long-lasting 
consequences, which cannot easily be removed.  Both the lesson 
from the Great Depression about the slowness and the painfulness 
of bank reconstruction, and the lesson about dependence on a 
large external provider of capital, are unpalatable. Limiting 
the size of banks that are too big or too interconnected to fail 
is a major political problem, especially as such institutions 
constitute a powerful lobbying force.  The current strategy of 
guaranteeing banks, but also deposits and a broad range of other 
liabilities, is likely to encourage a further extension rather 
than a roll-back of the too-big-to-fail doctrine.  Bank rescues 
have also had a significant impact on the deterioration of the 
fiscal position of many countries.   
  Trade is another area where major vulnerabilities will 
continue.  Currency breakdowns are often followed by trade 
fights.  Monetary policy is not perceived any longer as  solely 
promoting a stable measure of value, but also ( as in the 
1930’s) as a tool with which countries can fight each other for 
trade advantages. 
For a long time, it was much easier to repeat the soothing 
mantra that collectively the world community has learned how to 
avoid a 1929-type of collapse, and that the world’s central 
banks in 1987 or 2001 clearly showed that they had learned the 
right lesson. It is undoubtedly meritorious of governments to 
stabilize expectations, and to prevent a worse spiraling of  
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crisis.  But policy-makers and their advisers will create 
inappropriate expectations when some simple policy proposals are 
built up as the basis for the hope that they alone can guarantee 
recovery.  As both Europe and the United States are likely to 
continue to have rather anemic recoveries, it is as important to 
take a sober and realistic approach to the unpalatable lessons 
of the Great Depression as it is to celebrate the fundamental 
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